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The Islamic State (IS) declared the establishment of a Caliphate on June 29, 
2014 in Mosul, Iraq. Since that declaration, IS has communicated a four-part 
narrative to the global community through Dabiq magazine, its e-
publication. Each of the ten editions of Dabiq has provided insight into IS’s 
aspirations and reinforced its message of rejecting post-colonial structures. 
Critical to realizing its objective is establishing a foothold for the Caliphate 
through jihad (holy war), establishing legitimacy through jamaah 
(governance), achieving tawhid (unity), and expanding through hijrah 
(immigration). Each publication contains these narrative elements to 
document IS’s progress. Classifying, visualizing, and mapping will provide 
the analytical insight necessary to quantify the prioritization of IS narrative 
elements and identify the organization’s motivation.  
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 Over the last 16 months, the Islamic State (IS) has successfully 
demonstrated the ability to manage a multi-front conflict, generate billions in 
revenue, expand the boundaries of the Caliphate, and, most surprisingly, 
attract immigrants to the Caliphate. Much of its success is attributable to the 
deliberate and consistent 
employment of its religion-based 
narrative. IS leaders are 
methodically employing a 
narrative to mobilize sympathetic 
elements of the global Sunni Islam 
population. They communicate 
this narrative through official IS 
media outlets, social media, and 
micro blogging sites. Authors have 
pedantically detailed the strategic 
framework for this narrative in ten 
editions of the Dabiq e-magazine. 
Each publication of Dabiq has 
reinforced the call for jihad (holy war), establishing legitimacy through 
jamaah (governance), achieving tawhid (unity), and expanding through 
hijrah (immigration). IS leaders have systematically included geographic 
 
The Original 1916 Pico-Sykes 
Border: A goes to France, B goes 
to Great Britain 
Figure 1      Osman 2013 
 




elements in the narrative to create a multi-generational conflict between 
Islam and the Western world. The mobilization message within the narrative 
calls for the destruction of idolatry, innovation, and post-colonial 
structures—specifically the Pico-Sykes border between Iraq and Syria. Figure 
1 illustrates the original 1916 Pico-Sykes border. Mark Sykes, representing 
Great Britain, and Francois Georges-Picot, representing France, secretly 
drew up the borders following World War I. In the agreement, France gained 
control of the “A” area, or modern-day Syria, and Great Britain gained 
control of the “B” area, or modern-day Iraq (Osman 2013). Fundamentally, 
IS leaders designed the narrative to strengthen IS’s contiguous boundaries, 
continue non-contiguous expansion, and encourage religious violence in 
Western countries. Destruction of post-colonial structures, such as the Pico-
Sykes border, is a method of strengthening IS while weakening post-colonial 
structures. Physically removing the boundary between Iraq and Syria 
represents a tangible and symbolic victory to further the IS narrative.  
Brief History 
 One can trace the genealogy of radical Islam, and the sources of 
inspiration for IS, to select traditions of Islamic jurisprudence. An 
increasingly active vocalization advocating violence to achieve a political end 
has allowed IS and its predecessor Al Qaeda (AQ) to persevere. On the 
surface, IS and AQ are ideologically similar (Barret 2014). However, in 
reality, their nuanced theological interpretations and geographic aspirations 




place the organizations in diametric opposition. AQ’s interpretation of a 
defensive jihad justifies the use of violence against non-believers and 
colonial remnant governments. IS’s interpretations significantly overreach 
AQ’s interpretation and advocates for an active jihad. Under this 
interpretation, IS is compelled to cleanse its Caliphate of apostasy. By its 
definition, apostates include tribalists, secularists, Shiites, and anyone who 
rejects the legitimacy of the Caliph (Barret 2014).  
 IS’s declaration of a Caliphate is a paradigm-shifting event and a 
serous departure from contemporary jihadist tradition. Establishing a 
Caliphate has three preconditions and implications: (1) Recognizing the 
legitimacy of a Caliphate compels loyal adherents to immigrate to its 
boundaries, (2) maintaining the legitimacy of the Caliphate mandates the 
enforcement of strict and medieval interpretations of Sharia law, and (3) the 
larger the Caliphate grows, the longer it will endure, and the effectiveness 
with which it enforces Sharia law will continue to inspire global support 
(Barret 2014).   
Benefit of the Research 
 Every combat commander from Sun Tzu through present-day military 
strategists will affirm the necessity of understanding adversaries. In the 
summer of 2014, the U.S. government significantly underestimated IS’s 
resilience. The conventional wisdom at the time characterized IS as an AQ 
jayvee team. In retrospect, that assessment was entirely inaccurate. Due to 




this failure to fully understand the enemy, the U.S. government is still trying 
to understand IS and the full potential of the threat it poses.  
 In an effort to better understand IS’s strategic ambitions, an analysis 
of its primary means of communicating with people outside of the Caliphate 
is of great importance. As of September 1, 2015, IS has published ten 
editions of Dabiq to provide a step-by-step guide to supporters to join and 
support the Caliphate. Each edition of Dabiq contains thematic indicators of 
a unified narrative. Quantifying the value of each independent element may 
serve as a point of focus for the development of counter messaging 
strategies. Moreover, visualizing the spatial distribution of where narrative 
elements are present may help to characterize IS’s political motivations. This 
paper seeks not to fully understand IS and identify ways to defeat the 
organization, but to provide practitioners and planners with a starting point 
for classifying, quantifying, visualizing, and analyzing the temporal and 
spatial components of IS narrative elements.  
Preliminary Literature Review 
 A meaningful analysis of the IS narrative will require an 
interdisciplinary research approach using primary and secondary source 
data. As a starting point, research will be conducted across the topics of 
geopolitics, narratology, propaganda, IS history, and cartography, as well as 
a primary source evaluation of Dabiq magazine.   





 In the summer of 2014, IS gained control of mass swaths of Iraq and 
Syria using blitzkrieg-like tactics (Price 2014). Its advances all had common 
characteristics; they were swift, brutal, and predominantly in Sunni majority 
communities. Its seemingly unstoppable tactical successes in Iraq led to the 
nearly instantaneous collapse of the Iraqi Army (Price 2014). In 
predominately historic Sunni strongholds, such as Ninewa Province, the 
people offered little popular resistance. In some instances, the local 
populace embraced IS as a liberating force (Barret 2014).  
 Areas in southern Iraq, such as Bagdad, with a higher Shia population, 
provided a more unified defense against the initial IS onslaught. Areas in 
northeastern Iraq, in what is frequently referred to as Kurdistan, provided 
little tactical success for IS. The organization continues to meet strong 
resistance from the local population. The Kurdish resistance forces have 
been the primary ground force ally for the coalition-led efforts in Iraq and 
Syria (Price 2014). 
 Following its immediate battlefield success, IS redoubled its efforts in 
propaganda production. IS’s official media wing, Al-Hayat Media, began 
producing Dabiq magazine to publicize its narrative in June 2014. The first 
edition offered four critical narrative themes for continued success: jihad, 
jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah. These themes appear to have particular 
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religious meaning in the context of the contiguous area IS controls in Iraq 
and Syria. 
 Beyond its stated aspirations of 
building and growing a Caliphate 
within captured areas of Iraq and 
Syria, IS has global aspirations. IS 
has published details on social media 
of its five-year plan for expansion, 
which includes areas of North Africa, 
the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Europe, and China (Martel 2015). Figure 2 
shows a graphic allegedly posted to a Twitter account associated with the Al-
Hayat Media Center. This image shows a very ambitious expansion plan that 
is somewhat validated by subsequent expansion. This aspiration is supported 
by the continual pledges of allegiance received from like-minded Islamist 
organizations around the globe. To date, IS has accepted pledges of 
allegiance from organizations with ties in Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Egypt (Milton 2015).  
Narratology 
 The study of narratology suggests that narratives are a basic and 
constant form of human expression regardless of ethnic origin, primary 
language, or enculturation (Barthes 1975). Narratives provide a linear 
progression and sequence to link event actions in a discernable and 




repeatable format. According to the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (FM), a narrative, “an organizational scheme expressed in story 
form,” is central to insurgencies. Additionally, the FM highlights the role 
narratives perform: They channel ideology, express collective identity, model 
behavior, provide reasons for actions, and aid in interpreting others (Zalman 
2008).  
 Across linguistic and cultural barriers are reoccurring commonalties in 
successful narratives. Those narrative themes have been summarized as the 
three main elements of a narrative (Van Dijk 1975): 
 Audience: Implies that the subconscious of the audience develops a 
cognitive map of incoming information with the intention of recreation. 
Fundamental to this logic is that the audience seeks to become the 
narrator through including itself in the story.  
 Setting: A story must occur at a given time and place. Given humans’ 
struggle with spatial cognition, much of that information will be a 
simplification. A narrative can summarize details and truncate times. 
 Plot: Events that happen in a story provide the basic framework for 
the narrative. A good plot must have a beginning, middle, and end 
that outlines a series of events. These events must follow each other 
on a causal basis; it must make logical sense that one thing comes 
after another. 




 Each edition of Dabiq reinforces the IS narrative through calls to 
action. According to IS’s ideological interpretation, the establishment of a 
Caliphate morally compels adherents to immigrate to the Caliphate. If they 
are unable to immigrate, they have the option of establishing a local 
franchise or conducting attacks attributed to IS.   
Propaganda 
 Propaganda is a complementary function to terrorism. The act of 
terrorism is a highly choreographed event used by terror organizations to 
communicate a message to a broader audience. This is an ideal example of 
the metaphor of the “theater of terror” (Bueno et al. 2003). The “theater of 
terror” explains that the attacks, and even the victims, may have little to do 
with the motivation. In the modern age of propaganda, the goal of a terror 
attack is to gain mass media coverage (Bueno et al. 2003).   
A body of quantitative analysis examining propaganda content has 
identified thematic elements in contemporary Islamist propaganda design. A 
key element seen in nearly every jihadist media production is the 
justification for the use of violence (Weiman 2008). Furthermore, in the 
contemporary information environment, a qualitative assessment has 
identified three coalescing strategic nuclei in messaging (Torres 2006): 
 Religious nucleus: Fundamental principles of the hyper puritanical 
Salafist movement, including the need to return to the glory of the 




prophet and his companions as described in the Haditha and the 
Quran.  
 Political nucleus: An agenda to re-establish the Caliphate, politically 
uniting the countries with a Muslim majority and removing tyrants who 
govern Muslim states. 
 Instrumental nucleus: The need to mobilize the Muslim world so it 
can regain consciousness of its greatness and the humiliation it 
suffers. This demands action on behalf of a vanguard of genuine 
believers 
A propaganda technique terrorist organizations commonly employ is the 
projection of a Manichean world (O’Shaughnessy et al. 2009). They simplify 
the worldview to good versus evil. Islamist propaganda makes no room for 
negations, dissenting opinions, or compromise. Such propaganda allows for 
only absolute elements and the apocalyptic inevitability of a clash between 
Islam and the West. 
IS: The Organization 
 The etymology of the name IS conveys an evolving geographic 
ambition. That ambition has transitioned over time and represents a nuance 
in its aspirational geographic intent. In 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the 
original founder of what is now IS, pledged alliance to AQ leadership and 
formed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). The geographic ambition in that era was to 




Note: The Levant and Sham 
are both historic names 
describing areas of modern- 
day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Israel. The 
Islamists likely use these 
terms to reinforce their 
position on the illegitimacy of 
post-colonial political 
boundaries.  
form an Islamic Sunni State in western and central provinces of Iraq 
(Fishman 2008).   
 AQ-I formed additional alliances in Iraq and transitioned into the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006. Shortly after its formation, U.S. 
counterterror efforts killed Zarqawi and most of ISI’s top leadership (Barret 
2014). The ISI leadership was eventually transferred to Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi, the current self-proclaimed leader of the Caliphate.  
 Under the leadership of Baghdadi, the 
organization has taken on new ambitions 
and grown significantly. His has consolidated 
alliances with numerous Sunni factions in 
Iraq and Syria, developed a globally 
recognized brand of ultra-violent jihad, and 
declared himself the Caliph (Barret 2014). Following this declaration, the 
organization changed its name again, this time to the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL). An alternative translation yields the name the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). After months of battlefield success, and 
expansion beyond the contiguous boundaries of Iraq and Syria, the name 
changed again. The current name, IS, reflects the lofty ambitions of building 
a Sunni Caliphate from North Africa to China. The capital of the Caliphate is 
Dabiq, a city of historic and apocalyptic signification in northwestern Syria 
(Adnani 2014).  





 Scholars, journalists, activists, lobbyists, individuals, and terrorist 
organizations all exploit the narrative power of maps to tell non-fictional 
stories as support tools in their research and to assist in developing 
arguments about places. The potential of maps to both decipher and tell 
stories is virtually unlimited (Carquard 2014). 
 Harley’s early work in cartography, the Second Text within Maps, 
examines the relationships among political interests, power, and the hidden 
agendas of maps. Harley argues that maps provide a powerful rhetoric and 
can be critically examined as texts themselves. Overall, Harley concludes 
that through map deconstruction one can read “in the margins of the text” 
and identify contradictions to the apparent honesty of the image. Of equal 
importance, Monmonier, in How to Lie with Maps, identifies challenges 
associated with evolving digital cartographic practices and encourages 
healthy skepticism by consumers.  
 Clearly, IS understands the value and power of including geographic 
and cartographic elements in its propaganda publication. Nearly every 
edition of Dabiq includes explicit examples of the use of maps or satellite 
imagery. One of the clearest examples is the publication of its five--year 
plan on Twitter (see Figure 2). The image is designed for maximum impact 
for a very diverse audience. For IS’s followers, it is inspirational to see the 
narrative in action for IS’s expansion. For the Western audience, the 




intention is to instill fear and enhance the perception that IS remains 
unstoppable.  
 IS has also routinely provided text-based descriptions of its expansion. 
In each of the ten editions of Dabiq, IS has announced recent expansions 
and administrative boundary revisions. IS refers to its administrative 
structures, similar to provincial boundaries, as a wiliayats. Wiliayats are 
contiguous within Iraq and Syria and non-contiguous across North Africa and 
the Middle East. When IS announces a new administrative boundary, it 
provides a relative description within the text of Dabiq. It describes the cities 
or terrain features contained within the wiliayat. The contiguous boundaries 
purposefully ignore the Pico-Sykes border and span areas within Iraq and 
Syria. IS has yet to publish an official wiliayat map, but freelance journalists 
are actively compiling the information and mapping their findings. The 
boundaries used for this analysis were compiled by Alex Konstanos and 
published on an open street map in google earth. The boundaries were 
checked against the information in Dabiq for consistency.  
Design and Implementation 
Data Sources  
 The primary data source for this analysis is IS’s official publication, 
Dabiq magazine. Dabiq is produced by IS’s Al-Hayat Media Center and 
provides a venue for presenting the IS narrative to a global audience. As of 
September 1, 2015, ten editions of Dabiq were available. Each edition of 




Dabiq magazine was independently assessed for propaganda characteristics 
as defined by the work of O’Shaughnessy et al. Each edition clearly meets 
the definitional criteria of propaganda and demonstrates the characteristics 
of the religious, political, and instrumental nucleuses.   
 Below are summaries of all ten published editions of Dabiq magazine. 
The shortest edition, The Return of Khilafah, is 26 pages, and the longest 
edition, From Hypocrisy to Apostasy, is 83 pages. For ease of analysis and 
interpretation, the following describes each edition independently following 
the three narrative components: audience, plot, and setting. Each edition of 
Dabiq targets three primary audiences. The three audiences can roughly be 
defined by their location. For IS-contiguous provinces, the audience is 
primarily the local population. The second target audience is sympathetic 
jihad groups. This element of the narrative is intended to gain their support 
and expand the non-contiguous provinces. The third target audience is lone 
wolf attackers. This group is primarily located in Western countries and 
cannot otherwise participate in the Caliphate.  
The primary plot element is the key component discussed in each 
edition; generally, such elements are related to the title. In addition to 
discrete plot elements, each edition contains consistent thematic narrative 
elements. The first edition contains the narrative elements, and they provide 
the framework for this analysis. The four elements are (1) jihad (holy war), 




(2) jamaah (governance), (3) tawhid (unity), and (4) hijrah (migration) 
(Adnani 2014).  
 The opening remarks of every edition include a quote from IS’s 
founding member, Abu Musab as-Zarqawi: “The Spark has been lit here in 
Iraq and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it 
burns the crusaders army in Dabiq.” The opening quote reinforces IS’s 
ambition to draw Western powers into a broader regional conflict and 
ultimately stage an apocalyptical battle in Northwestern Syria. 
1. The Return of Khilafah: The primary plot element discussed in the first 
edition of Dabiq is the religious authority and precedent for establishing a 
Caliphate. In this edition, IS provides details and context to convince the 
readership that its movement will be viewed historically as a true Caliphate. 
It offers readers with a call to action to join the Caliphate and avoid the 
blight of hypocrisy and apostasy. Within the text, IS compels followers to 
migrate (hijrah) to the Caliphate, experience the glory of holy war (jihad), 
join the family of the Caliphate (tawhid), and help establish a new 
community (jamaah). It also furnishes step-by-step guidance for 
establishing franchise organizations for followers unable to join the Caliphate 
in Sham. The following are the steps laid out in the first edition of Dabiq:  
(Step 1) Jihad – conduct destabilizing attacks and prevent the regime 
from providing for its people; (Step 2) Jamaah – develop a sense of 
community that coalesces around a common enemy; (Step 3) Tawhid 




– Establish a Caliphate and spread tawhid; (Step 4) Hijrah – move 
forces to areas of ungoverned or politically unstable spaces. (Adnani 
2014)  
In the first edition, nearly every aspect of the content is set to Iraq and 
Syria (Adnani 2014). 
2. The Flood: The dominant plot element for the second edition of Dabiq 
compares IS’s movement to the great flood. In Old Testament tradition, this 
is a reference to Noah’s ark. In its analogy, IS associates the establishment 
of a Caliphate to a flood meant to cleanse Earth. The Manichean worldview 
offers room for only one religion. If you are not a follower of the Caliph, you 
are an opponent. If you are an opponent, you are an apostate. Apostates are 
valid targets for jihad. Their rejection of Islam is punishable by death. In this 
edition, IS highlights numerous IS victories throughout Iraq in Syria. Aligned 
with its stated mission, IS provides numerous examples of jihad, jamaah, 
and tawhid and a select few examples of hijrah. In this edition, the 
propensity of reporting is set in Iraq and Syria. Interestingly, IS includes a 
specific call to action from individual followers who are abroad and unable to 
migrate to Sham. IS offers guidance for followers to pledge their loyalty on 
social media and conduct attacks in their home countries. The specified 
locations for the attacks are the United States, Canada, Australia, France, 
and any country supporting the war against IS.  




Location of the Historic City of Dabiq 





3. The Call to Hijrah: As the edition title suggests, the plot element 
contained within the third edition is hijrah (migration) to IS. Much of the 
discussion centers on the religious mandate to migrate to Sham and join the 
jihad. IS makes significant appeals to an educated Western audience by 
criticizing all educated Muslims, including doctors, lawyers, engineers, 
bureaucrats. IS calls them hypocrites for dodging their obligation to engage 
in jihad. IS gives educated Muslims an alternative option; if they migrate to 
the Caliphate, they can serve the community in their current profession. IS 
strengthens its appeal by highlighting the status of working-class slaves, a 
status many disaffected minorities feel they occupy in modern societies. IS 
makes it clear throughout this edition that its ambitions go far beyond 
violence. IS is building a Caliphate and needs followers to establish a society 
based on medieval interpretations of Sharia law. 
 This edition also marks 
the American entry into the 
fight on IS. IS draws an explicit 
connection between U.S. 
interventions and the 
beheading of American 
journalist James Foley. In IS’s 
words, the killing of James 
Foley was retaliation for U.S. 




air support and interventions against IS operations in Iraq and Syria.  
 The setting for much of the third edition is the Halab wiliayats of Syria 
from the perspective of the Syrian Army. The liberation of Halab includes 
gaining control of the historically significant city of Dabiq. The city of Dabiq 
is the namesake of the al-Hayat magazine and has significant meaning in the 
IS narrative.  Figure 3 depicts a rough location for Dabiq in northwest Syria, 
in the Halab wiliayat, as described in this edition of Dabiq. Additionally, 
Dabiq is referenced in historic Islamic texts, as the final battle between 
Islam and Rome. Additionally, the city of Dabiq is explicitly identified by 
founding member Abu Musab as-Zarqawi as the location IS will face the 
crusading army (Adnani 2014). 
4. The Failed Crusade: The primary plot of the fourth edition is the U.S.-
led coalition against IS. In the message, IS provides anecdotal evidence of 
the destruction of the Pico-Sykes border separating Iraq and Syria. IS 
highlights post-colonial structures, treaties, and puppet governments as 
primary points of grievance. In this edition, and several subsequent editions, 
IS denounces the Pico-Sykes border as a conspiratorial plot to weaken Arab 
unity and instill human-made governments.  




 Two New Wiliayats: Furat and Fallujah  
Figure 4       Dabiq Magazine 
 In this edition, IS introduces a new geographic component to its 
establishment of a state. In the fourth edition, IS announces the formation 
of two new administrative 
boundaries called wiliayats, 
which are similar to 
provinces. In the 
vernacular IS refers to 
administrative areas as 
wiliayats. The two new 
wiliayats are represented in 
Figure 4 and are located in 
Western Iraq. The new 
wiliayats, Furat and Fallujah, are what would be considered contemporary 
al-Anbar province in Iraq. IS includes in the text a description of the areas 
encompassed by the new administrative boundary. Establishing new 
provinces is IS’s method of emphasizing the destruction of post-colonial 
geographic boundaries.  
 The setting for most of this edition is Iraq and Syria. Thematically, IS 
provides significant detail on battles and victories in Iraq and Syria. Most 
significantly, IS justifies with visceral hatred its victories against the against 
the Yazidi peoples near Mount Sinjar. In its interpretation, the Yezidis are a 
devil-worshiping cult, and IS must exterminate them. IS devotes several 




Islamic State Non-Contiguous Wiliayats 
Figure 5                             Dabiq Magazine 
pages to providing religious justification for the genocide and enslavement of 
IS’s captives and characterizes U.S. intervention as futile.   
5. Remaining and Expanding: The plot of the fifth edition of Dabiq 
devotes particular emphasis to IS’s continued expansion. From IS’s 
perspective, the organization is still winning the tactical and strategic war. 
The conflict in Iraq and Syria has served as a battle cry for the Muslim world 
to coalesce and mobilize.  









region.  Figure 
5 depicts the 
countries of origin for incoming pledges, predominantly in the Middle East 
and North Africa. IS has accepted pledges of loyalty from organizations in 
the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. Throughout the 
fifth edition, examples of each of the four narrative elements are present in 




all of the newly proclaimed franchised wiliayats. The edition closes with the 
taking of credit for three lone wolf attacks. IS asserts that the terrorist 
attacks in Australia, Canada, and New York were inspired by IS’s call to 
action in the second edition of Dabiq. At this point, IS has demonstrated 
significant control within the contiguous boundaries of its state in Iraq and 
Syria, expansion to non-contiguous wiliayats throughout the region, and a 
global presence through the use of attributed lone wolf attacks (Adnani 
2014).  
6. Al-Qa'idah of Waziristan: The plot for the sixth edition of Dabiq 
deviates slightly from previous editions’ narrative elements. In this edition, 
IS devotes nearly half of the content and commentary to challenging AQ 
ideology and actions. Much of the grievances form open challenges to AQ 
leaders and AQ actions in Afghanistan and Yemen. The core grievance 
centers on the fact that AQ has had a presence in those locations for years 
and has never attempted to establish Sharia law. AQ has primarily devoted 
its resources to self-preservation and plotting external attacks.   
 On the surface, AQ and IS may seem like very similar organizations 
with similar tactics and objectives. However, from an insider’s standpoint, 
they are ideologically incapable of cooperation. IS views the establishment of 
a Caliphate, along with the jamaah requirements, as being of paramount 
importance. IS openly and willingly declares war on anyone that is opposed 




to its doctrine. In contrast, AQ primarily views Western intervention as its 
number one priority, which is external jihad against the West. 
 Paradoxically, the inclination and desire to attack Western targets is 
how IS starts this edition. Similar to the fifth edition, IS takes credit for 
declared acts of terror around the world. In this case, it is taking credit for 
additional attacks in Australia and France. In both instances, the actions are 
praised by IS as being dedicated forms of tawhid and pledges of loyalty to 
the Caliph.   
7. From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The seventh edition narrative describes 
the transition of hypocrisy to apostasy. IS discusses the disappearance of 
the “gray zone” as it relates to the establishment of a Caliphate. In general 
terms, it is dividing the Arab community into two camps: those who support 
the Caliphate and those who do not. Those who do not are officially guilty of 
apostasy. In IS’s interpretation, apostasy is a crime punishable by death. 
The play on words allows for repentance from individuals who were not quick 
to join. IS suggests that not living under Sharia law previously made one a 
hypocrite. Now that people have the option to affiliate themselves with the 
Caliphate, they are apostates if they do not. The seventh edition devotes 
several sections to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France. Since the 
perpetrator of those attacks officially proclaimed loyalty to IS, this is a huge 
media victory. For this particular event, IS leaves no ambiguity about 
whether it was a random act of violence or an inspired act. This edition, like 




Two New Wiliayats: Jazirah and Dijla 
Figure 6             Dabiq Magazine 
the previous editions, hits on all four elements of the narrative and 
demonstrates sufficient spatial diversity. The edition includes numerous 
interviews from fighters who have immigrated to Sham, pledging loyalty 
from Pakistan, and conducting attacks around the world (Adnani 2014).  
8. Shari'ah Alone Will Rule Africa: For the eighth edition of Dabiq, the 
primary plot element 




throughout this 68-page 
periodical, IS condemns 
post-colonial structures 
as un-Islamic. IS 
specifically discusses the 
necessity to erase the Pico-Sykes border separating Iraq and Syria and the 
expulsion of tribal influence. Like the previous three editions, IS has devoted 
print space to taking credit for terrorist attacks, in this case in Denmark, 
Tunisia, and Yemen. In its interpretation, this is another example of the 
rejection of nationalism. It is clear from the context of the message that the 
notion of attacking targets abroad is well within the scope of its goals. In this 
edition, IS announces two more wiliayats within the contiguous boundaries. 




The new divisions will enable IS leadership to better administer jamaah for 
the people of norther Iraq. Figure 6 depicts the two new wiliayats, Jazirah 
and Dijla, as IS describes in this edition of Dabiq. In addition to evidence 
that it is expanding its sphere of control within its contiguous borders, IS 
continues to gain tawhid from outside the area. The most recent and 
significant addition of tawhid comes from Nigeria. Boko Haram has pledged 
loyalty to IS and continues its murderous rampage across Western Africa 
(Adnani 2014).  
9. They Plot and Allah Plots: The primary narrative plot element IS 
discusses in the ninth edition revolves around conspiracy theories. The 
fundamental argument is that conspiracy theories are an excuse to neglect 
the duties of jihad. IS goes further than in previous editions in discussing 
nationalism, secularism, and patriotism. In this edition, it takes a historical 
look at the post-World War I boundaries of Pico-Sykes. In its view, the 
establishment of the border separating Iraq and Syria is a core grievance of 
the Caliphate. IS has gone to great lengths to erase all meaningful 
enforcement of the border and redraw new provincial boundaries.  
 In line with previous editions, IS has taken credit for and affiliated 
itself with the art show shooters in Texas. It justifies and commends the 
attackers for defending the mocking of the prophet Mohammed. For the 
ninth edition, IS takes an inward look and reports more on Iraq and Syria 
than in the last six editions. A significant amount of reporting in this edition 




focuses on the deliberate liberation of the Yarmuk Camp in Dimashq wiliayat 
in southern Syria. It documents the liberation battle, alliances, and post-
liberation conditions on the ground. Lastly, in the ninth edition, IS dedicates 
several sections to highlighting the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. and Western 
powers’ alliance against IS (Adnani 2014).  
10. The Laws of Allah or the Laws of Men: In the tenth edition of Dabiq, 
the common narrative theme is jamaah through the enforcement of Sharia 
law. IS dedicates more than half of the text to comparing its medieval 
interpretation and enforcement of Sharia law to that of contemporaries. It 
challenges the authenticity and desire of the current rulers on their lack of 
enforcement and provides numerous examples of how and where IS is 
enforcing Sharia law. 
 It also dedicates several sections within the text to criticizing its 
opposition. IS expresses particular religious and political grievances against 
the Kurdish resistance forces and declares the Kurdish resistance apostates. 
Its harshest judgments attack the Kurdish affiliation with socialism and 
communism. IS further attacks the populist resistance movement for its 
historic and current alignment with a nationalist agenda. That nationalist 
agenda is wholesale written off as apostasy and further justification of IS’s 
jihad against that resistance movement.  
 Like previous editions, the tenth edition of Dabiq announces the 
pledging of loyalty, acceptance, and establishment of a new wiliayat. The 




new wiliayat is in the Caucasus mountain region of Dagestan and will be 
called Qawqaz. Numerous jihadist organizations from this region have 
pledged loyalty to IS. However, beyond pledges of loyalty and the 
establishment of a wiliayat, IS reports very little in Dabiq.  
 Lastly, this edition of Dabiq comments on an event described as 
Bloody Sunday. Based on the context, IS takes credit for coordinating three 
near simultaneous attacks in one day. The attacks took place in France, 
Tunisia, and Kuwait. All three attacks were designed to inflict casualties 
against citizens of countries that are supporting the fight against IS. 
Thematically, this seems to be in line with IS’s jihad narrative element, 
identifying civilians as legitimate targets for terrorist activities (Adnani 
2014).  
Research Methods  
 Common to all ten editions of Dabiq are affirmative indications of 
propaganda elements and the thematic use of a religious-based mobilization 
narrative. The classification of narrative elements provided in the first edition 
of Dabiq will serve as a framework for classifying the text in each of the ten 
editions. The classification of narrative elements will allow for the 
development of a data dictionary and rules for data capture for each of the 
four narrative terms: jihad, jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah. 
 Figure 7 depicts a data dictionary to associate synonymous terms to 
the narrative elements. Each narrative element included in the database 




Narrative Element Data Dictionary 
Hijrah Migration, joining the 




Jamaah Governance, law 
enforcement, taxation, 
education, administration, 
public services, charity  
Tawhid Unity, pledges of loyalty, 
brotherhood, friendship, 
martyrs, repenting  
Jihad Liberation, attacks, 
combat, post-combat 
carnage,  pre-combat 
training  
Narrative Element Data Dictionary  
Figure 7    Dabiq Magazine 










or more than 
one narrative 
element will 
be duplicated. Data entries must have an explicit or implicitly derived 
temporal aspect. Narrative elements quoted from historic Islamic texts, such 
as the Quran or Haditha will not be included in the database.  
 The narrative element database from the 10 editions of Dabiq yielded 
766 data points, which will facilitate quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Since each data point has a temporal, spatial, and contextual component, 
the data will support a range of analytical techniques.  
 Dabiq is a primary data source published by IS’s media arm. The 
results of the data provide insight into the most important narrative 





Narrative Element by Frequency 
Figure 8           Dabiq Magazine 
components for IS’s message, the most valuable locations, and the 
correlation of location to narrative elements. Assessing narrative elements 
offers a quantitative metric to aid in identifying the most valuable narrative 
elements from an IS perspective. Mapping the narrative elements furnishes 
insight into which narrative elements are occurring when and where.  
Results 
Quantifying Narrative Components  
 Starting with narrative 
elements, the data were 
collated to provide a 
visualization of the importance 
of IS locations for each of the 
elements.  Figure 8 displays 
the narrative identifying jihad 
as the dominant element with 
35% of the narrative. The 
second most common element reflecting the priority for sense of community 
and rule of law is jamaah at 29% of the narrative. In a close third, at 28%, 
is tawhid, reflecting IS’s value of brotherhood and unity among followers. In 
a somewhat surprising last place, occupying 8%, is hijrah. Hijrah is the 
narrative element that necessitates migration to join the Caliphate.  
























  Frequency by Country  
Figure 9                  Dabiq  
 Given the Western media hype of the number of foreign fighters 
migrating to join IS, it is somewhat surprising that hijrah is by far the least 
accounted for narrative element in Dabiq. The anecdotal evidence present in 
Dabiq of hijrah primarily takes the form of rare interviews of recent 
immigrants and commemorations of foreign martyrs. The significantly low 
value on hijrah potentially indicates that IS’s strength comes from 
indigenous support and alliances within the jihadist community, not wholly 
from individual immigration.  
Narrative Analysis by Geographic 
Location  
 Quantifying narrative elements across 
geography provides analytical insight into 
the intrinsic value of a specific location. 
Figure 9 breaks down the 766 data points 
across the globe to identify a baseline of 
geographic importance to the narrative. As 
expected, Iraq and Syria dominate the 
geographic setting in terms of narrative 
elements. Iraq has 276 data points; in a 
close second is Syria, with 273 data points. 
The remaining countries represent non-contiguous IS-affiliated wiliayats. In 
order of priority, they are Egypt (35), Pakistan (34), Libya (32), Yemen (28), 




Dagestan (22), Saudi Arabia (18), Algeria (12), and Nigeria (12). From the 
evaluation of these data points, IS likely views the contiguous wiliayats 
within Iraq and Syria as most valuable. Further, IS likely views the official 
non-contiguous wiliayats across the Middle East and North Africa as on the 
second tier of importance. This analysis is consistent with the calls to action 
outlined in the first and second edition of Dabiq. The first call to action 
compelled adherents to immigrate to the Caliphate, wage jihad, and 
establish jamaah and tawhid. The reproach for not conducting hijrah was to 
pledge loyalty to the Caliph and start a franchise node in one’s home 
country.   
 Further geographic analysis of the narrative elements is possible 
across Iraq and Syria. In nearly every case, the narrative element data 
capture process allowed for an analysis at the wiliayat level. Since the 
overall value to the narrative for Iraq and Syria are nearly equal, each will 
be assessed independently. Figure 10 illustrates the narrative distribution 
within Iraq. The Ninewa wiliayat had 126 associated data points, which is by 
far the highest frequency of data points in Iraq. The city of Mosul is the 
secondary capital for IS and lies in the Ninewa wiliayat. Adding a layer of 
complexity to the analysis, IS has divided the contemporary Iraqi province of 
Ninewa into three IS wiliayats: Ninewa (126), Dijla (10), and Jazirah (17). 
The declaration of the two new administrative wiliayats did not come until 
the eighth edition of Dabiq. It is nearly impossible to determine prior to the 

















Frequency of Narrative 
Elements: Iraq  
Figure 10  Dabiq 
declaration where exactly the data fall. For continuity of analysis, all three 
wiliayats will be grouped for analysis but assessed as independent. Similarly, 
the contemporary Iraqi province of Anbar was divided in the fourth edition of 
Dabiq. The new administrative wiliayats associated with Anbar are Furat and 
Fallujah. The three wiliayats will be combined for visual analysis and 
assessed independently. Anbar has the 
second-highest number of narrative element 
data points at 26 with the addition of Furat 
(14) and Fallujah (19). The remaining Iraqi 
wiliayats in order are Salahuddin (21), 
Bagdad (16), Diyala (10), Kirkuk (10), and 
Janub (8). Both Bagdad and Janub are in 
Shia-dominated areas of Iraq, so IS’s claim 
of control is likely aspirational. The number 
of narrative element data points reflects a 
combination of activity through jihad and control through jamaah.   












Frequency of Narrative 
Elements: Syria  
Figure 11 Dabiq 
 Figure 11 illustrates the narrative distribution within Syria. The Raqqah 
wiliayat had 105 associated data points, the highest in Syria. The city of 
Raqqah is the primary capital for IS and lies in 
the Raqqah wiliayat. The next highest 
frequency of narrative components is attributed 
to Halab wiliayat. Halab wiliayat is directly 
adjacent to Raqqah and south of the Turkish 
border. Purely from a homogeneity and 
logistical standpoint, it makes analytical sense 
that Halab and Raqqah would have the highest raw count for narrative 
components. The remaining Syrian wiliayats in descending order of 
importance are Barakah (38), Dimashq (20), Kahir (15), and Homs (10). 
The lower narrative element data capture in these areas likely indicates less 
IS control and fewer activity areas. Additionally, each of those provinces 
lacks major population centers under IS’s sphere of influence.  
Temporal Visualization of Narrative Components  
 Within the database, a key data capture component was the Dabiq 
edition number. The edition number corresponds with an Islamic calendar 
date and provides a metric with which to conduct temporal analysis. The 
edition number coupled with the primary narrative components and 
geographic location provide a powerful visualization for analysis. The 




visualization coupled with the context of narrator, plot, and setting provide a 
basis to make critical analytical judgments.  
 Starting with Iraq, in the first edition, all four narrative components 
are readily identifiable. However, Figure 12 shows a clear narrative emphasis 
on the components of jihad and tawhid. Based on the context, the key 
information component is that the struggle in Iraq will lead to unity. In the 
second and third editions, the primary narrative component is jamaah. This 
is likely a reflection of the state of conditions on the ground. After the initial 
onslaught of violence, IS’s priority became establishing governance and 
instituting Sharia law. With the fourth edition, one observes a significant 
spike in the narrative components of jihad and tawhid.  
 This is a reflection of extending the Caliphate into new areas of Iraq 
and establishing new relationships. In the fifth edition, titled Remaining and 
 Narrative Element over Edition: Iraq 
Figure 12                   Dabiq 




Expanding, the narrative components bottom out across Iraq. The focus of 
this edition is expanding the non-contiguous boundaries of the Caliphate to 
new areas in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, the sixth edition is 
outwardly focused, dedicating more space to discussing Afghanistan and the 
conflict with AQ. In the seventh edition, the focus of Dabiq is addressing a 
wide range of grievances and provides very little detail on the status of the 
Caliphate. For the eighth, ninth, and tenth editions, one observes massive 
spikes in the narrative components of jamaah and tawhid. In these editions, 
the length of the publication has also increased significantly and the format 
has been somewhat changed. IS is primarily interested in conveying its 
moral high ground for establishing a Caliphate. In this context, it justifies 
use of jihad for eliminating dissent and implementing effective 
administration and legitimate governance. It dedicates significant content 
space to describing the administration of courts, taxation, civil service, and 
the resumption of medical student training.   
 As shown in Figure 13, in Syria, there is a notable lack of the narrative 
element of hijrah. The remaining three narrative elements are represented, 
with a notably high representation of jamaah. Given the context of Raqqah’s 
being IS headquarters in Syria, IS likely put greater effort into establishing 
governance early in the conflict. For the second edition, one observes a 
significant spike in the mention of jihad. Analytically, this corresponds to the 
main plot element and the desire to instill fear and passivism in the 





Narrative Element over Edition: Syria 
Figure 13                                                Dabiq 
populace. Elevating the fear of retribution is likely a strategic move to quell 
any thought of resistance to IS.  
 The concepts of hijrah and jihad spike in the third edition for Syria as a 
point of comparison. During the same timeframe in Iraq, hijrah and jihad 
have 50% less presence in Dabiq. Contextually, the quantitative analysis 
supports the primary plot for the third edition, which is the call to hijrah. The 
discrepancy between Iraq and Syria in this instance is likely a function of 
accessibility for immigrants to access Syria versus Iraq. For the fourth, fifth, 
and sixth editions, all data points for Syria decrease significantly. The data 
follow a very similar trend as the Iraqi data. Contextually, the decrease in 
representation is related to the outward focus of IS in those three editions. 
The narrative consideration focuses on the expansion of non-contiguous IS 
wiliayats. For the seventh edition, one observes significant data spikes in 




jamaah and tawhid. This is likely a reflection of the primary plot and setting 
elements in the seventh edition. They form an inward look and a 
reinvigorated effort to encourage followers to move to Sham. The direction 
IS takes to attain that objective is to de-emphasize the violence and 
emphasize the administration of services and brotherhood. Interestingly, in 
the eighth edition, one witnesses a sharp decrease in all reporting for Syria. 
For the ninth and tenth editions, jamaah and jihad dominate the Syrian 
narrative elements. The plot and setting elements for these data indicate 
that IS is expanding its themes from the sixth edition and its objective is to 
demonstrate legitimacy. It continues to provide examples of where it is 
expanding and where and how it provides services. It is also noteworthy that 
in the last three editions the length of the magazine and format for 
presenting provincial level updates has changed.  
Cartographic Visualization of Narrative Components  
Cumulative Narrative Elements 
 This visualization aggregates all four narrative elements by geographic 
frequency distributions and provides a foundation to identify the IS 
narrative’s center of gravity. Within the contiguous boundaries of the 
proclaimed Caliphate are signs of significant variance within the narrative. 
The choropleth map in Figure 14 represents a three breaks quantile analysis 
for all four narrative elements.  The three breaks provide a relative metric 
for assessing low, medium, and high levels for the recorded narrative 




Cumulative Narrative Elements: 3 Breaks Quantile 
Figure 14                                                                           Dabiq 
elements by wiliayat. Within Dabiq, narrative element instances are 
significantly higher in the Ninewa, Raqqah, and Halab wiliayats. This 
enumerated visualization is in agreement with data from the previous 
analytical steps.  
 On the lower end of the enumeration are the wiliayats of Homs, Khair, 
Dijla, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Janub. For the most part, these wiliayats lie on the 
boundaries of the Caliphate and represent areas that are not fully under IS’s 
control. The two exceptions are Khair and Dijla. Based on their proximity to 




Raqqah and Ninewah, they are likely underrepresented within the Dabiq 
narrative elements. For Khair, the lower reporting is likely based on a 
relatively lower and more sparsely settled region of the Caliphate. For Dijla, 
the low reporting is likely explained by the late creation of the new wiliayat. 
The new administrative boundary was not announced until the eighth edition 
of Dabiq. In earlier editions, narrative elements in part targeting Dijla likely 
targeted Ninewa as a whole.  
Jihad as a Percentage of Total Reporting by Wiliayat   
 The narrative element jihad represents 35% of the topics covered in 
Dabiq magazine. The data visualization in Figure 15 illustrates the narrative 
element jihad as a percentage of total reporting across geography. This 
allows one to analyze the data independently within each of the wiliayats. 
For this analysis, 0-3% represents a relatively low number of reporting 
events and 7-14% represents a relatively high number of reporting events. 
The narrative element jihad is represented in the data dictionary as 
liberation, attack, combat, post-combat carnage, and pre-combat training. 
Within in the ten editions of Dabiq, IS has openly declared jihad against all 
forms of resistance and apostasy. In its declared hostilities, it has included 
Syrian government forces, Iraqi government forces, Kurdish resistance 
forces, tribal militias, and generally any group that fails to pledge loyalty to 
the Caliph.  





Jihad as a Percentage of Total Reporting by Wiliayat 
Figure 15          Dabiq 
 
 For the temporal context, the graphic provides insight into where the 
preponderance of self-reported conflict has occurred to date. Similar to the 
amalgamated visualization in Figure 14, the northern wiliayats have the 
highest reported instances of jihad. In the context of its strongest resistance 
being Kurdish forces, it makes analytical sense for the most glorified combat 
to occur in hotly contested territories.  




 In this visualization, Anbar stands out as a potential anomaly. Several 
geographic factors complicate this analysis. First, Anbar covers a massive 
expanse of uninhabited desert. The majority of the population and IS 
activities have likely occurred in the eastern portion of the wiliayat. Second, 
in the ninth edition of Dabiq, IS reports multiple enduring engagements 
among IS, Iraqi government forces, Shia militias, and Sunni tribal forces. 
Finally, in the fourth edition, IS subdivides Anbar into three wiliayats: Anbar, 
Furat, and Fallujah. For the first three editions, IS singularly attributes all 
the activities in those areas to Anbar. The situation in Anbar is highly 
contested. IS has not established enough security in the area to move to the 
follow-on phases of establishing jamaah and tawhid.  
 The wiliayat of Janub also represents a potential anomaly. As a 
percentage of total reporting, jihad is the most active narrative element in 
Janub. Janub represents a nearly homogenous Shia population and lies far 
outside of IS’s control, so the narrative element for Janub is jihad. For the 
most part, the attacks in Janub are best described as hit and run tactics. 










Tawhid and Jamaah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat 
Figure 16                                                             Dabiq 
Tawhid and Jamaah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat  
 As a natural evolution of attaining the ultimate goals of the Caliphate, 
IS must establish governance and unity within its wiliayats. Viewed 
independently, jamaah represents 29% of the total narrative, and tawhid 
represents 28%. When spatially represented, the two elements are nearly 
indistinguishable in their distribution. For visualization, the elements have 
been combined for the contiguous IS wiliayats. For the visualization in Figure 




16, the sums of jamaah and tawhid have been displayed on a choropleth 
map using natural breaks. This technique provides a raw count of the 
combined narrative elements by wiliayat. The result is a revisualization that 
likely represents IS’s control and absorption of a given population. Not 
surprisingly, Halab, Raqqah, and Ninewa have the highest reported levels of 
governance and unity. Wiliayats adjacent to those have the next highest. 
The further one moves from Raqqah and Mosul, the less control IS has on 
the local population.   
 The wiliayat Dimashq likely represents an anomaly. A significant 
amount of reporting covered in the ninth edition of Dabiq is dedicated to 
improvements of the Yarmuk Camp in Dimashq. The ninth edition is the only 
time IS directly identifies Dimashq as an area of control. The liberation and 
subsequent establishment of governance in Yarmuk is likely very limited in 
duration. It is unlikely that IS has the ability to project influence that far 
beyond its support bases in northern Syria.  
Hijrah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat  
 The final narrative element visualized in Figure 17 represents the 
totality of the IS narrative. As IS outlines in the third edition of Dabiq, hijrah 
likely represents the full realization of the Caliphate. To maintain legitimacy 
within jihadi circles, it must continue to grow. To grow, it must attract 
immigrants to improve its ability to administer the newly gained territories. 





Hijrah Natural Breaks by Wiliayat 
Figure 17                                                           Dabiq 
IS has gone to great lengths in its propaganda to portray the Caliphate as a 
place of opportunity.  
 However, despite this emphasis and calls to action, hijrah only 
represents 8% of the total narrative. That relatively small number can be 
further isolated to areas that are under the highest level of control. Halab, 
Raqqah, and Ninewa are the areas that have the highest anecdotal indication 
of immigration. The anomalies indicated in Fallujah represent an analytical 
judgment to dual-classify series of suicide bombings in the city of Ramadi as 




both jihad and hijrah. In reality, that likely fails to meet the desired intent 
for attracting immigrants.  
Conclusion  
  The geopolitical context predicating the rise of IS in Iraq and Syria is 
nested in ethno-sectarian divisions. Ethno-sectarian divisions transcend the 
contemporary political boundaries separating modern Iraq and Syria. IS has 
realized its greatest military and governance success is in historically Sunni-
dominated areas. IS has faced the greatest organized resistance in areas 
with a predominantly Kurdish population. IS has also faced resistance in 
areas where the Shia-dominated governments of Iraq and Syria maintain 
popular and military support.  
 IS’s primary venue for communicating its religious-based narrative to 
the outside world is Dabiq magazine. As of September 1, 2015, IS has 
published ten editions of Dabiq through the Al-Hayat Media Center. Each 
edition of Dabiq reveals classic narrative elements Van Dijk described, 
including audience, plot, and setting. The first edition of Dabiq outlines the 
objectives of the magazine and provides a taxonomy for classifying IS’s 
strategic narrative. The strategic narrative comprises four thematic 
elements: jihad, jamaah, tawhid, and hijrah.  
 Each of the ten editions of Dabiq independently, and collectively, 
meets the contemporary definition of Islamic propaganda as described by 
Torres, including a religious, ideological, and political nucleus. Additionally, 




IS has mastered the “theater of terror” Bueno et al. described. IS has 
effectively synchronized the timing and delivery of its narrative with highly 
choreographed and heinous acts of violence. One of the best examples is the 
release of the decapitation video of a U.S. reporter coinciding with the 
declaration of jihad against the United States. Finally, IS has consistently 
projected a view of a Manichean world as described by O’Shaughnessy et al. 
Its messages consist of absolute elements and the apocalyptic inevitability of 
a clash between “true” Islam and the West. 
 IS seemingly appeared out of nowhere in the summer of 2014 as an 
unstoppable and rapidly advancing force in Iraq and Syria. The organization 
was originally downplayed and characterized as an AQ JV team. In reality, IS 
has had an enduring presence in the region, predating the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. The founding IS leadership had ideological and pragmatic associations 
with AQ in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Barret describes, IS was nearly 
destroyed by the end of the U.S. combat operations in Iraq in 2008. Since 
2008, IS has continued to rebuild and refine its ambitions. Through its 
propaganda and strategic narrative, IS has detailed its regional and global 
ambitions. One of its clearest messages calls for the destruction of idolatry, 
innovation, and post-colonial structures—specifically the Pico-Sykes border 
between Iraq and Syria.   
Assessing each edition of Dabiq reveals an ambitious framework to 
establish and administer a Caliphate. The Caliphate has a three-tier spatial 




scale: the contiguous, non-contiguous, and global scale. At the contiguous 
scale, IS has created administrative boundaries that supplant the Pico-Sykes 
border dividing Iraq and Syria. The new boundaries intentionally span areas 
of Iraq and Syria. The non-contiguous scale pertains to pledges of loyalty 
and acceptance of franchise wiliayats across the Middle East and North 
Africa. At the global scale, IS has reached out to a Western audience and 
advocated for lone-wolf attacks in Western countries.  
The taxonomy detailed in the first edition of Dabiq provides a 
framework for quantitative and qualitative analysis of IS narrative elements. 
Each of the narrative elements represents the four phases of IS expansion of 
the Caliphate. In agreement with the steps outlined in Dabiq number one, it 
is apparent through quantification that there is a sequencing priority within 
the narrative elements. The first step for IS when entering a new area is to 
extinguish resistance and dissention through jihad. Once it has dismantled 
the current system, the next step is to implement jamaah and establish 
tawhid. Finally, after these three conditions have been met, the Caliphate 
becomes appealing for hijrah. 
 The classification, visualization, and analytical processes have revealed 
spatial prioritizations to IS narrative elements. The results of the analysis 
are most succinctly summarized by Tobler’s first law of geography. Based on 
the visualization of the narrative elements, the wiliayats, starting with Halab 
and extending east toward Ninewa, are the power centers for the Caliphate. 




The level of IS control decays precipitously across the contiguous wiliayats 
the further they are removed from the state capital of Raqqah. The 
anomalous visualization is caused by newly established administrative 
boundaries. The new boundaries introduced in Iraq and Syria changed the 
precision of the data and caused erroneous reporting. The visualization of 
the IS narrative will eventually reflect greater control in Kahir, Jazirah, 
Furat, Anbar, and Salah al-Din.   
The classification, visualization, and analysis of the IS narrative 
elements illuminate IS’s true intentions. IS has presented a religious-based 
narrative to achieve pragmatic political goals. It has used religion as a basis 
for justifying violence while taking tangible steps to realize the primary 
political goal of destroying post-colonial structures, including the Pico-Sykes 
border. Supplanting administrative boundaries and controlling territory on 
both sides of the contemporary border is a systematic decision to change the 
status quo.   
Discussion  
 Removing veracity from the discourse, the IS narrative is an extremely 
powerful tool for coalescing and mobilizing a globally restive Sunni 
population. The IS narrative appeals primarily to an underrepresented and 
often hopeless Sunni youth. In counterterrorism journals, scholars frequently 
speculate that the attraction for Westerners would be jihadism as primarily 
adventurism versus a religious mandate. The existence of IS provides a 




setting for unfolding the plot elements of the narrative. The narrative 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that fosters the Manichean worldview and 
the inevitability of a clash of civilizations.  
 In practical terms, the veracity and authenticity of the IS narrative is a 
moot point. Long after IS becomes a degraded and defeated military, its 
narrative will persist. The actions it has set in motion will almost certainly 
result in a multi-generational challenge for the entire region. The sectarian 
underpinnings have further divided an already strained existence among the 
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations throughout Iraq and Syria. 
 IS has realized tangible steps toward renunciation of post-colonial 
structures. It has contributed to the destruction of the Syrian and Iraqi 
governments. The Pico-Sykes border distinguishing those two countries has 
at least been temporarily supplanted through the destruction of border 
control points. IS has gone further and literally posed an alternative 
administrative alignment through the creation of new wiliayats that straddle 
the historic Pico-Sykes border.   
 The intensity of the Syrian civil war, the fierce resistance by Kurdish 
forces, and the lack of unity in the Shia populace make it decreasingly likely 
that post-colonial borders will survive. In the near term, conflict has 
coalesced along ethnic and sectarian lines and will continue to define the 
region. In the long term, those boundaries will likely recognize semi-
autonomous Sunni regions, Kurdish regions, and Shia regions.  




Areas for Further Research 
 The process of classifying, visualizing and analyzing the narrative 
elements contained in Dabiq magazine is simply a starting point. IS’s media 
wing has multiple venues for messaging a global audience for recruitment 
and fundraising. The narrative element framework, data dictionary, and 
analytical methodologies can be scaled to accommodate additional data 
sources.  
 Applying the above analytical methodologies to regional media, social 
media, and micro blogs would significantly improve verification of the IS 
narrative. The inclusion of additional data sources would verify the 
decentralized delivery of a unified message. The more coherent and 
consistent the message remains across delivery platforms the more deeply 
the community of interest has internalized the content.  
 Numerous social media data mining tools, such as mention map, hoot 
sweet, and tweet deck, would provide venues for additional data discovery 
and validation. For more analytically rigorous and reliable results, 
commercially available or custom data mining should be developed. There 
are numerous challenges with incorporating new data sources. Some of the 
upfront concerns are associated with data precision. The data in the initial 
model were only precise at the wiliayat level. Data provided from a 
commercial social media data mining service would be georeferenced and 
provide much greater detail. Regional accessibility to the Internet is also an 




analytical challenge. It is highly likely that the preponderance of IS narrative 
reporting on social media would come from populated areas with services 
such as electricity and Internet. Areas in the desert would go underreported.  
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